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HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN THE CHICAGO
METROPOLITAN AREA:
THE LEGACY OF THE BROWN DECISION
Pierre de Vise*
Thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board
of Education,' placed at the forefront of this nation's political agenda the
fight for racial equality. Congress followed the Court's lead with legislation
aimed at ending racial discrimination. Nonetheless, today urban centers and
surrounding suburbs remain highly segregated. Chicago, a battleground against
housing bias during the 1960's, remains a prime example of continued racial
segregation.
The Brown decision has resulted in the eradication of de jure segregation.
De facto segregation, however, continues. Statutes, such as the federal Fair
Housing Act 2 and the equal protection clause,3 are the sole tools through
* Associate Professor of Public Administration, Roosevelt University, Chicago, Illinois.
Professor deVise has served as a demographic expert witness in several fair housing cases in
Chicago, among them Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, HOPE, Inc. v.
County of DuPage, and Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, discussed herein.
This article is excerpted from Integration in Chicago Thirty Years after the Brown Decision,
a paper presented at a seminar entitled "Brown v. Board of Education-Thirty Years Later"
sponsored by the DePaul University College of Law, December 4, 1984 and from chapter seven
of the author's forthcoming book, DESCENT FROM THIE SUMMIT: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO,
1966-1984.
In addition to citations in the footnotes, the reader is referred to a valuable compendium
of 312 fair housing cases in Chicago and the nation. See F. CARUSO, CASE LAW MATRIX: GUIDE
TO PRACTICE OPEN HOUSING LAW (1982). For a more extensive discussion of the implementation
and effect of judicial policies on American society, see C. JOHNSON & B. CANON, JUDICIAL
POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984).
The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Mark Szaflarski.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), enforced, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Brown, the Supreme Court
invalidated state laws which required or permitted segregation based on a student's race.
Specifically, the Court held that de jure segregation of students was "inherently unequal," and
thus in violation of the equal protection clause. 347 U.S. at 495. The Brown decision is analyzed
in Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1.
(1955), and Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
2. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982). The Act, in part, makes it unlawful:
[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 3604(a).
3. The fourteenth amendment requires that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Use of the equal
protection clause in discrimination actions is analyzed in Schwemm, From Washington to
Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977
U. ILL. L.F. 961, and Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal
Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh,
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725 (1977).
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which discrimination can be fought and integration can be achieved. Unfor-
tunately, the United States Supreme Court has effectively precluded aggres-
sive use of the equal protection clause against state entities to combat
segregation.
This article first briefly reviews the fight against segregation from Brown
to the present date. Special emphasis will be given to events occurring in
Chicago. Then, statistical data is presented which demonstrates that only
minimal headway has been made in integrating the Chicago metropolitan
area. Methods of documenting housing discrimination will also be addressed.
This article concludes with the author's analysis of the impact of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.," a Supreme Court
opinion, and HOPE, Inc. v. County of DuPagej a Seventh Circuit decision,
which have, in part, enervated the battle against housing discrimination.
I. BACKGROUND
A. From Brown to Arlington Heights
The United States Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown was a major
landmark and a turning point in American public policy. Brown overturned
the separate but equal doctrine enunciated by the Court in 1896 in Plessy v.
Ferguson.6 The Brown decision's impact on racial equality, however, has
been slow and indirect because it takes a congruence of judicial, adminis-
trative, and legislative action, supported by the national mood, to advance
new and controversial political agendas. To illustrate, ten years after the
decision, only 1.2% of all black students attended non-segregated schools in
the eleven states of the Confederacy. 7 It took another dozen years for the
Court to prohibit racial discrimination in private schools.'
The Court's own timidity in setting forth guidelines to bring about school
desegregation in 1955 was partly responsible for this slow implementation.
The Court's plea for "deliberate speed" 9 was an open invitation for delay
and non-compliance. Thus, in 1956, the State of Arkansas declared the
Brown decision unconstitutional and established a State Sovereignty Com-
mission to prevent school integration.' 0 The following year, the Governor of
Arkansas used National Guard troops to forcibly prevent the integration of
Central High School in Little Rock. The Supreme Court was forced to
4. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
5. 738 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE
LAW: DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 6 (1976).
8. See Runyon v. McCray, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
10. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1958).
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reaffirm the Brown decision over the "violent resistance" of the State of
Arkansas in Cooper v. Aaron."
It took a major shift in the national mood and a new presidential admin-
istration to bring about enforcement of the Brown decision. The decision's
psychological impact on blacks was partly responsible for this shift. Martin
Luther King, Jr. was foremost among civil rights leaders who exploited the
opportunities presented both by the Brown decision and the Kennedy admin-
istration. In 1964, President Johnson's landslide victory against the states'
rights conservative Barry Goldwater further signaled the new national mood.
Democrats then held a better than two-to-one majority in the House, enabling
liberals to wrest control of House committees from the conservative coalition
of southern Democrats and Republicans.
This mandate made possible the civil rights and Great Society legislation
unleashed by the eighty-eighth and eighty-ninth Congresses, beginning with
the Civil Rights Act of 196412 and culminating in the Fair Housing Act of
1968.1 A new jurisprudence of class action suits was begun, based on the
power of injunction conferred on lower federal courts in Brown v. Board
of Education (Brown II).4 The class action became the major vehicle of
social change for those seeking implementation of the nation's goal of racial
equality first declared by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.1
Official school segregation in the South had been finally eradicated by the
end of the 1960's, notably in Griffin v. School Board,'6 a case in which
the Court struck down state-subsidized private white school systems. Similarly,
in Alexander v. Board of Education,'7 the Court rejected "freedom-of-
choice" school plans. Attention shifted to de facto school segregation re-
sulting from residential segregation in northern cities. Segregation was fought
with two weapons-student busing and open housing laws.
The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. led to the passage of the
previously blocked Fair Housing Act, outlawing housing discrimination by
11. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
12. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included the Desegration of
Public Education Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1982), and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
13. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982)).
14. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Brown II, the Court determined that the district courts should
be charged with the responsibility of ensuring that school officials followed the dictates of the
initial Brown decision. Id. at 299.
15. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(1982)).
16. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
17. 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam). For the lower court opinions of the cases with which
the Alexander case was consolidated, see United States v. Hinds Co. School Bd., 417 F.2d 852
(5th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, on
remand, 423 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1969).
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realtors, lenders, and other institutions. Two months later, in Jones v. Mayer
Co.,'" the Court reaffirmed its ruling that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
prohibited racial bias in all sales and rentals of housing, including private
transactions. Thus, the way was paved for aggressive housing litigation to
overcome de facto segregation.
The Burger Court, however, failed to follow this lead. On the busing
front, the Burger Court approved a lower court-ordered busing plan for
Charlotte, North Carolina and struck down a state prohibition of busing in
Swann v. Board of Education.'9 Nonetheless, the Burger Court refused to
approve an interdistrict busing plan in Detroit in Milliken v. Bradley.2" The
Milliken decision, in effect, absolved white suburbs of responsibility for de
facto school segregation.2 '
Similarly, on the housing front, the Burger Court's application of the
Washington v. Davis" criteria to the Arlington Heights" case dampened the
use of housing discrimination actions to overcome segregation. The ques-
tion of discriminatory intent was basic to these decisions. The Davis decision
required proof of discriminatory intent in complaints of racial bias in
qualifying tests for public jobs.2 4 The Arlington Heights decision extended
the Davis ruling to complaints of racial bias in housing and zoning cases
alleging violations of the equal protection clause.2 5
B. The Fight Against Segregation In Chicago
In January 1966 Martin Luther King, Jr. chose Chicago for a national
campaign against housing bias. He moved into a flat in North Lawndale,
commuting to Atlanta on weekends. Several exchanges between King and
18. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Jones decision has been extensively reviewed and analyzed.
See, e.g., Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969); Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment
and the Federal Anti-Discriminatory Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019 (1969); Note, The "New"
Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294 (1969).
19. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For comments on this decision, see Fiss, The Charlotte-Macklenburg
Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHn. L. REV. 697 (1971);
Powe, The Road to Swann: Mobile County Crawls to the Bus, 51 TEX. L. REV. 505 (1973);
Comment, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility, 39 U.
CHI. L. REV. 421 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-School Desegregation-Guidelines in
Implementation, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 562 (1971).
20. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The Milliken decision has been the subject of extensive commen-
tary. See Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and
Winning Small Wars: The View Largely From Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535; Taylor,
Desegregating Urban School Systems After Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 751 (1975);
Comment, Milliken v. Bradley in Historical Perspective: The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle,
69 Nw. U.L. REV. 799 (1974); Note, Interdistrict Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28
STAN. L. REV. 521 (1976).
21. See 418 U.S. at 745.
22. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see infra text accompanying notes 80-89.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
24. 426 U.S. at 239.
25. 429 U.S. at 264-65.
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Mayor Richard Daley culminated in April when Daley and seven black
committeemen told King to go back to Georgia. 26 In frustration, King
announced a massive campaign of civil disobedience to begin on July 10,
1966. King warned Daley of "social disaster" if nothing was done to relieve
the "seething desperation" of Chicago's blacks.2 7
Almost in a self-fulfilling prophecy, Chicago's west side was wracked by
riots, looting, and arson over the next two days. In the next few weeks,
King led marches in Chicago's ethnic white areas, culminating in the march
on Marquette Park on August 5, during which King was felled by rocks. In
response to King's actions and in order to defuse the racial anger ignited by
King, Daley agreed to convene the Chicago Conference on Religion and
Race. The resulting summit agreement led to the creation of the watchdog
agency named the Leadership Council For Metropolitan Open Communities
(Leadership Council).
After 1970, the Leadership Council brought a series of suits against local
governments and institutions for housing discrimination, including two cases
that led to important Supreme Court decisions-Arlington Heights and
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.28 The Arlington Heights decision
allowed the Court to elaborate on the kinds of evidence required to prove
discriminatory intent, following the Davis criteria. The Bellwood decision-
reinforced by Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman29-gave black testers standing
to sue real estate brokers accused of racial "steering." '30
The Leadership Council also became involved in the Supreme Court's
decision in Hills v. Gautreaux.3' The Gautreaux decision affirmed the lower
26. See Oates, Kings' Crusade, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 17, 1982, (Magazine), at 29.
27. Id. at 30.
28. 441 U.S. 91 (1979). In Bellwood, the Court held that certain residents of Bellwood,
Illinois and the village itself had standing to sue for violations of the Fair Housing Act as
"indirect victims" of housing discrimination. Id. at 115. The residents and village were indirect
victims because they alleged that the defendant's actions were robbing their neighbborhood
"of its racial balance and stability." Id. at 111; see Note, Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood: The
Development and Application of Standing to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 9 CAP. U.L. REV.
175 (1979); Note, Standing to Sue Under Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act: Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 33 Sw. L.J. 917 (1979).
29. 455 U.S. 363 (1982). The Havens decision gave testers standing to sue under the Fair
Housing Act if the defendants allegedly misrepresented housing availability. Id. at 374-75.; see
LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Framework for Analysis,
1982 DUKE L.J. 1013; McRea, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman: Extended Standing in Racial
Steering Cases to Housing Associations and Testors, 22 URB. L. ANN. 107 (1981); Recent
Decision, Civil Rights-Racial Discrimination-Fair Housing Act of 1968-Standing For Test-
ers, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 295 (1982).
30. See Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 103 n.9; Havens, 455 U.S. at 373-75.
31. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). The Seventh Circuit opinion in Gautreaux, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.
1974), is analyzed in Recent Decision, Civil Rights-Remedies-To Remedy Discriminatory
Public Housing Practices Existing Within the Confines of a City, a Federal District Court Need
Not Limit Its Decree to the City's Municipal Boundaries, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663 (1975);
Recent Development, Civil Rights-Milliken v. Bradley Does Not Entirely Foreclose Inter-
District Remedies for Single-District Violations, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 135.
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court ruling that the Chicago Housing Authority was guilty of operating a
racially discriminatory housing program,32 and approved a metropolitan-wide
remedy of scattered-site public housing." Through the actions of the Lead-
ership Council, Chicago's position in the forefront of the housing discrim-
ination battle shifted from the streets in the 1960's to the courtroom in the
1970's.
These civil rights victories were more symbolical than substantial. Their
net impact has been minimal. Fewer than two hundred high-rise section eight
units were built in Arlington Heights,3 4 and fewer than six hundred public
housing units have been built since the original Gautreaux decision in 1969." ,
This meager result is due in part to the fact that the scattered-site solution
was politically and financially nonviable. Moreover, other local governments
have seized upon the scattered-site remedy as a guise to prevent the construc-
tion of high-rise section eight family housing.3 6
The local steering cases unleashed by the Bellwood and Havens decisions
have so far resulted in nothing more than wrist-slapping penalties against
brokers charged with steering. Here, too, the anti-steering strategy has
fostered more active "benign steering" efforts by suburbs attempting to
manage racial integration. Thus, the net effect of these decisions has been
minimal at best. As will be shown in the next section, statistics demonstrate
that the Chicago metropolitan area today remains highly segregated.
II. THE PATTERN OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION:
A STATISTICAL STUDY
Sixteen years after the Civil Rights Act of 1968, blacks remain highly
concentrated in central cities and in a few suburban enclaves. Proportionally,
the black suburban population is very low and is increasing at a snail's pace.
Between 1970 and 1980, the black suburban population in the nation in-
creased from 4%'o to 6%, and in Chicago from 4% to 5%.11 The great
32. 425 U.S. at 296.
33. Id. at 305-06.
34. Linden Place Apartments, a 12 acre, $11 million § 8 development at Golf and Goebbert
Roads in Arlington Heights, was opened in April 1982. The project has a four-story building
with 109 one-bedroom units for the the elderly, and ten two-story buildings with 80 townhouses
for families. Battle Over; Subsidized Units Open, Chicago Tribune, May 15, 1982, § 14, at IG.
35. The Chicago Housing Authority built 117 units during the 1970's. Between 1980 and
1983 another 200 units were built. An additional 500 existing private units are scheduled for
§ 8 rehabilitation. DeZutter, Neighborhood News-Behind the Myths: a Tour of CHA Scattered-
site Housing, Reader (Chicago), July 22, 1983, at 3.
36. For example, in United States v. City of Birmingham, Mich., 538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D.
Mich. 1982), aff'd as modified, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984), a city commission attempted to
by-pass the construction of subsidized low-income housing by a promise to rehabilitate several
scattered-site residences for low-income occupancy. 538 F. Supp. at 823. Ultimately, the
Birmingham court restrained city officials from engaging in any activity which interfered with
the construction of the subsidized housing. Id. at 831.
37. The figures were derived by comparing data in the 1970 Census and 1980 Census. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION (1981-1983);
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majority of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) blacks are still
confined to central cities-75% in 1980 as compared to 80%7 in 1970.18
In considering the existence and cause of residential segregation, it is useful
to distinguish between the pattern of segregation and the degree of segre-
gation.39 The pattern of segregation is usually measured by the centralization
of blacks relative to that of whites. The proportions of metropolitan area
blacks and whites living in the city may vary. More sophisticated measures
of centralization include population-density gradients and mean distance to
the central business district. The degree of segregation is usually measured
by comparing the actual distribution of blacks and whites in urban neigh-
borhoods to the expected distribution in a random, color-blind society. The
most conventional index of the degree of segregation is called the "dissim-
ilarity index."
A. Measuring the Degree of Segregation
Underlying all explanations of racial residential segregation is a model of
urban residential location. The standard econometric model of urban land
use assumes that households trade off commuting costs and the price of
housing within an urban area. It is also hypothesized that high-income
households live farther from employment centers than low-income house-
holds because the former value low density, better air, and better neighbors
above the time and cost of commuting."0
It is assumed that without discrimination black and white households of
similar socioeconomic characteristics would live the same distances from
employment centers. At least twenty separate indices have been proposed as
measures of segregation. 4 1 Only a handful have gained wide currency. These
indices vary mainly with respect to whether they assume random distribution
with or without socioeconomic differences.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION (1973).
38. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION
(1981-1983); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION
(1973).
39. A recent survey of the state of the art in housing segregation and discrimination research
is contained in Yinger, Galster, Smith & Eggers, The Status of Research into Racial Discrimi-
nation and Segregation in American Housing Markets, in 6 OFFICE OF PUBLIC POLICY DEVEL-
OPMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN HOUSING
AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS 55, 55-175 (1979). Yinger is a major contributor to housing discrim-
ination analysis, and created the now conventional dichotomies of prejudice/discrimination as
causes of the pattern/degree of segregation.
40. Id. at 76. Both market and Marxist economists use a monocentric model of urban rent
to explain the relationship between commuting costs and preferences, and the pattern of
residential location of poor and non-poor households. The monocentric model was developed
by David Harvey and Edwin S. Mills. See D. HARVEY, SOCIETY, THE CITY, AND THE SPACE
ECONOMY OF URBANISM (1972); E.S. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS (1972).
41. For a review of several segregation indices, see Yinger, Galster, Smith & Eggers, supra
note 39, at 71-80.
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The dissimilarity index, which is the most prevalent index of residential
segregation, assumes that a color-blind distribution of households would be
random. According to this index, over 80% of the blacks and whites in the
average American city in 1970 would have had to move to equalize the
proportion of black population in each neighborhood. 42 In Chicago, 9207o
of the population would have had to move to achieve a proportional equality.
A variation of the dissimilarity index is the market segregation coefficient,
43
which standardizes housing expenditures and tenure of black households
with the cost and type of housing in each of 167 communities in the Chicago
SMSA. In a color-blind housing market standardized to housing expendi-
tures, about 66076 of Chicago SMSA black households would have lived in
predominantly white communities in 1970. A calculation of the segregation
index of this hypothetical redistribution of households yields an index of 23.
Given an actual segregation index in Chicago of 92, this suggests that
differences in housing expenditures and income explain only about 25076 of
the segregation. Calculations of indices inspired by the market segregation
coefficient for other cities suggest that housing expenditures and income
differences explain 10% to 50% of the segregation measured by the dissim-
ilarity index in the census year of 1970.
In 1970, Chicago was the most racially segregated large city in the nation.
44
Because of the slowdown of black population growth and the increased
dispersion of blacks to some previously all-white areas in Chicago and
suburbs, three of four racial segregation indices have eased somewhat from
their record-high levels in 1970.
Chicago's neighborhood segregation index was 90 in 1980, compared to
91 in 1970. 41 This means that 90076 of Chicago's blacks and whites would
have had to move to achieve a hypothetical racial mix in which each of the
city's 820 census tracts would have the identical 40076 proportional black
mix. To illustrate, 9607 of the city's blacks and 606 of the city's whites live
in tracts over 40% black. This, in turn, means that 9407 of the city's whites
and 407 of the city's black live in tracts under 4007 black.
A relative measure of the rapidity of racial transition is the black consol-
idation index, calculated as follows. There were 54 census tracts in Chicago
which passed from predominantly white to predominantly black during the
1970's compared to 85 tracts in the 1960's.46 The percentage of blacks in
42. The original calculations of the dissimilarity index for major American cities are found
in K.E. TAEUBER & A.F. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND NEIGH-
BORHOOD CHANGE (1965).
43. The market segregation coefficient was originally proposed by Raymond E. Zelder. See
Zelder, Racial Segregation in Urban Housing Markets, 10 J. REGIONAL ScI. 93, 93-105 (1970).
The market segregation coefficent was adapted by this author in an analysis based on 1970
census tract data in the Chicago SMSA. deVise, The status of integration in suburban Chicago,
Vol. 9 No. 61 FOCUS/Midwest 9, 9-18 (1973).
44. See deVise, Suburbs and Expressways, Barriers in Urban America: Chicago's Widening
Color Gap: 1971, INTEGRATED EDUC., Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 37-42.
45. See P. devise, Black Power and White Control in Chicago 5 (1981) (unpublished
manuscript prepared at the School of Urban Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle).
46. Id.
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this transititional belt rose from 12% to 89% during the last decade.4 7 The
77% gain in the decade yields a consolidation index of 77, compared to 80
in 1970. This projects an average six-year span from the time the first blacks
move into a tract to the time the tract becomes predominantly black. The
black centralization index for the Chicago SMSA declined from 90 in 1970
to 84 in 1980.48 This means that 84% of the six-county SMSA black popu-
lation lived in Chicago in 1980, compared to 90076 in 1970.
A calculation of the housing market coefficient for Chicago suburbs in
1970 reveals that Arlington Heights has a coefficient of 5.0-meaning that
only 5% of the suburb's population would be black in a color-blind housing
market based on housing costs alone. This was the lowest coefficient for
any of the area's twenty suburbs of over 50,000 people.49 Thus, Arlington
Heights is the most segregated housing market among the area's largest
suburbs.
B. The Causes of Segregation
The above statistics demonstrate that Chicago and its surrounding suburbs
remain highly segregated. The cause of such segregation can be explained in
one of three ways: socioeconomic segregation, voluntary segregation, or
prejudice. All three of these can result in racial segregation.
Socioeconomic segregation is based on marital status, family type and
size, income, and assets.5 0 Generally, these characteristics would tend to
explain part of the difference in the age, condition, cost, and tenure of
black-occupied housing. To the extent that older, renter-occupied housing is
clustered in certain inner areas of the city, low socioeconomic status also
explains part of the residential concentration of blacks.
Already cited5 were studies that attempted to measure the contribution of
lower income and housing expenditures to segregation. As noted, the low
income and housing expeditures can explain 10% to 50% of the segregation.
With respect to other socioeconomic differences, no other ethnic group,
including Puerto Ricans, exhibit a segregation index comparable to that of
blacks. Moreover, unlike other groups, the improved socioeconomic status
of blacks over time is not associated with integration.12
Voluntary segregation is also often mentioned as an explanation of racial
segregation. 3 Thus, supposedly blacks prefer to live with other blacks and,
negatively, blacks prefer not to live with whites. There is little evidence that
47. Id.
48. Id. at 6.
49. See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,
414 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975).
50. See Yinger, Galster, Smith & Eggers, supra note 39, at 76-79.
51. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
52. See A.B. SCHNARE, RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION By RACE IN U.S. MERROPOLITAN AREAS:
AN ANALYSIS ACROSS CITIES AND OVER TIME, CONTRACT REPORT No. 246-2 (1977) (published
by the Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.).
53. See deVise, supra note 43, at 14.
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whites moving into black areas precipitate "black flight" and there is no
conventional wisdom to the effect that whites moving into the neighborhood
will lower property values. The connection between voluntary segregation
and racial prejudice does illustrate that racial prejudice may vary in degree
and intensity. Black prejudice, however, does not typically translate into acts
of discrimination in the housing market.
Racial prejudice, or aversion of racial contacts, becomes significant in the
housing market when it translates into acts of discrimination. Not all housing
discrimination, however, is the result of prejudice. Economic factors may
exploit the prejudice of others by resulting in different prices in racially
defined housing submarkets. Thus, housing discrimination is, one explana-
tion of segregation.
III. DISCRIMINATION IN THE HousING MARKET
Discrimination in the housing market most commonly occurs when the
price asked for property is dependent upon the prospective buyer's race.
Market discrimination, seller prejudice, and buyer prejudice are three major
sources of pricing discrimination.14 Price discrimination is determined by the
presence of three factors. First, the market for housing must be divided into
two or more submarkets. Second, there must be an inability to shift buyers
from one market to another. Third, there must be differences in the price
elasiticity of demand between white and black buyers. 5
Market discrimination, such as that alleged in Bellwood,5 6 exemplifies these
three conditions. Realtors steer white prospects into white areas, and black
prospects into black or racially changing areas. White buyers bid only against
whites, and black buyers bid only against blacks. If the price elasticity of
demand by blacks is higher than for whites, sellers will receive lower prices
in the black-designated submarkets than for comparable homes in white-
designated submarkets. To the extent that prices in the black submarket are
negatively associated with the percentage of blacks in the area or the length
of time since the submarket became all black, blacks who bought in the
early stages of racial transition would experience continuous price decline
relative to prices in the white submarket.
There is substantial statistical evidence that housing market discrimination
is taking place in the Chicago area.17 Such discrimination may be the result
54. See Yinger, Galster, Smith & Eggers, supra note 39, at 80.
55. Id. at 80-81. Various interpretations of housing price discrimination can be found in
J.F. KAIN & J.M. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 56-91 (1975); R.F. MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING (1969); J. YINGER, PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION IN THE URBAN HOUSING MARKET (1977); King & Miezkowski, Racial Discrim-
ination, Segregation and the Price of Housing, 81 J. POL. ECON. 590, 590-606 (1973).
56. See supra notes 28, 30 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. For a review of other studies of the dual
housing market in Chicago, see J. McDONALD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN URBAN HOUSING
MARKET (1979).
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of steering, panic peddling, or other acts by realtors. Most Chicago area
neighborhoods that are over 10% black are closed to entry by white residents
and become all-black in approximately a decade.
There are at least four sources of data evidencing black housing price
decline relative to white housing prices in Chicago. Three of the four sources
reflect the devaluation of black residences as compared to white residences.
The fourth indicator suggests that black price discounts were a little larger
in 1970 than in 1960.
The first indicator of relative price decline is the value of owner-occupied
housing transferred from white to black occupancy. 8 Using the 1960 val-
uation as a basis for comparison, the 1970 value of white-black transfers
was $500 to $7,000 below the value of white-white transfers. Moreover, the
higher the home value between 1960 and 1970, the lower the relative gain
in value between 1960 and 1970. For example, white-occupied housing valued
between $10,000 and $12,500 in 1960 had a median value in 1970 of $17,500
if white-owned and $16,575 if black-owned. White occupied housing valued
between $20,000 and $25,000 in 1960 had a 1970 median value of $26,500
for white owners and $19,400 for black owners.
In a second exercise, Chicago's census tracts were grouped into five racial
zones.5 9 Expressed in 1970 dollars, median home values in the 1960's in-
creased by $2,400 in the white zone. In black zones, however, values declined
by $1,600. Further, home values declined by $600 in the black expansion
zone and by $1,300 in the bi-racial zone.
Residential sales data published by the Society of Real Estate Appraisers
(SREA) Market Data Center provided the third source of data. 60 Using
SREA sales data for 1972 and controlling for forty variables of housing
type, space, and condition, it was found that a single family home in the
black expansion zone sold for $1,314 less than a similar house in the outlying
white zone. In the 1960 black zone, the difference was $4,974.
The 1970 Census of Housing provides the fourth indicator of black housing
discounts. 6' In cross-tabulations between black and non-black owner-occu-
pancy, it was found that black home prices were between 90% and 92% of
white home prices after controlling for differences in number of rooms and
bathrooms and in age of the structure. This corresponds to a discount of
between $1,700 and $2,100 for the average house. In the 1960 census, black
58. See Housing Construction in the Suburbs and Housing Demand and Prices in the Inner
City: Hearings Before the Senate Banking Committee on Oversight on the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 206-35 (1976) (statement of Pierre deVise).
59. See deVise, Chicago, 1971: Ready for Another Fire?, in GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON AMERICAN POVERTY 47, 47-66 (1972).
60. See Berry, Ghetto Expansion and Single-Family Housing Prices: Chicago, 1968-1972,
3 J. URB. ECON. 397-423 (1976).
61. See P. deVise, Chicago's Black Housing Market Revisited (1977) (unpublished manu-
script prepared at the School of Urban Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle).
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home prices were between 92% and 9507o of white home prices, after con-
trolling for size and year built. This corresponds to discounts of between
$900 and $1,400 for the average home. Moreover, the price discount for
blacks increased with the size of the unit, suggesting a relative surplus of
larger houses in the black housing market. There also appears to be a slightly
higher price discount to black owners of new homes. Some of this advantage,
however, is attributable to a disproportionate number of small units for this
class of housing.
Along with market discrimination, seller prejudice may also result in
housing discrimination. The seller may not desire to deal with blacks. Though
leaving the neighborhood, the seller may still respect the neighbors' aversion
to living with blacks. If the seller lists his or her house with a broker, the
prejudice of white residents and of other brokers may result in the broker's
refusal to show homes to blacks. Any deviation from this kind of racial
steering may bring charges of panic-peddling and the loss of business from
future white owner-sellers. 62 As recently as 1960, the customary penalty for
a broker selling to a black in a white neighborhood was expulsion from the
board of realtors. 63 Still today, many black brokers are excluded from local
real estate boards and multiple listing services. 64 Sellers and their agents may
also reflect the prejudice of white buyers who might lose interest in a house
shown to black prospects.
Home buyers' surveys show that blacks spend considerably more time in
the housing search than whites, and depend more on "for sale" signs and
word-of-mouth for locating available houses. 65 Further, blacks are shown
fewer listings by brokers and inspect fewer houses in fewer areas before
making a purchase decision. 66 Black home-buyers are perceived by brokers
to have a different set of expectations than white buyers. According to such
surveys, whether due to seller discrimination or to buyer perception of
discrimination, information and options offered to black home-seekers by
realtors are significantly below the level offered to white home-buyers.
The racial prejudice of white sellers, brokers, and buyers is reinforced by
the prejudice of other real estate interests. Brokers steer blacks to black
areas and black transitional areas and whites to all-white areas because they
perceive racial segregation as the preference of both the home buyer and the
receiving community. Violation of this perceived preference can threaten the
62. These and other examples of racial steering by brokers are contained in R. HELPER,
RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS (1969), and J. Yinger, Economic
Incentives, Institutions, and Racial Discrimination: The Case of Real Estate Brokers, Discussion
Paper No. 78-4 (1978) (prepared for the Department of City and Regional Planning, Harvard
University).
63. See R. HELPER, supra note 62; Yinger, Galster, Smith & Eggers, supra note 39, at 84.
64. See Yinger, Galster, Smith & Eggers, supra note 39, at 84-85.
65. These findings are found in Lake, Housing Search Experiences of Black and White
Suburban Homebuyers, in AMERICA'S HOUSING: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 439, 439-84 (1980).
66. Id.
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future business of the broker. 67 Mortgage lenders, appraisers, underwriters,
and insurers also tend to discriminate racially. Such discrimination may be
carried out in recognition of the community's preference for segregation, as
a perceived mechanism of economic screening, or to profit from price
discrimination.
Real estate interests are among the economic interests most affected by
housing segregation and rapid racial change. Property owners and mortgage
lenders are more often victims than beneficiaries because of declining prop-
erty values and housing abandonment. Real estate brokers benefit in the
transitional stage when sales are high but lose in the racial consolidation
stage when sales activity slows down.
IV. DOCUMENTING RACIAL STEERING PRACTICES
Illegal steering consists of practices by realtors of "steering" black home-
buyers to .all-black areas or to areas that are changing from all-white to
all-black. 68 Steering is undertaken against the preferences of whites and blacks
who wish to live in stable, integrated areas. The Bellwood decision and the
Haven decision stand as the most important Supreme Court decisions in
this area. 69
Evidence of racial steering by realtors comes from a number of sources.
One source is the home buyer survey which compares search information
and costs for blacks and whites of similar tastes and socioeconomic status
who have recently purchased a house. 70 Another type of survey utilizes white
and black "testers." These testers attempt to represent similar housing tastes
and reflect the same socioeconomic status as the targeted test area's inhab-
itants .71
A. Problems in Documenting Racial Steering
Many steering surveys suffer from deficiencies of data, methodology, or
validity. Surveys of recent home buyers cannot entirely control for variables
other than race when comparing the housing search experiences of white
and black home buyers. Attitudes and expectations of buyers are particularly
hard to measure. Surveys using teams of white and black testers can overcome
the problems of controlling for variables other than race, depending on the
training and competence of the testers.
67. See Howe, deVise & Caruso, Commentary, LAND USE LAW AND ZONING DIG., June,
1979, at 4-10.
68. See P. deVise, Black Suburbanization in the Chicago Area: Patterns of Segregation and
Integration 1-2 (1980) (unpublished manuscript).
69. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
70. See Lake, supra note 65.
71. Examples of tester surveys of steering are reported in Pearce, Gatekeepers and Home-
seekers: Institutional Patterns in Racial Steering, 26 Soc. PROB. 325, 325-42 (1979).
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Additionally, the selection of a broker or a homebuying location poses a
problem of random sampling for both kinds of surveys. Testing surveys
conducted by community and civic groups dedicated to stablizing housing
integration will tend to be concentrated in areas where racial steering is
taking place. Results from such surveys cannot be projected for brokers in
an entire urban area. On the other hand, testing surveys covering a larger
urban area where most housing submarkets are white would tend to under-
state brokers' propensities to steer. Brokers located in areas where all the
home seekers are white have little opportunity to steer. Moreover, the
appearance of a black home seeker in a broker's office in such areas may
lead to the presumption that the prospect is a tester. The cautious broker
may thus treat the black home seeker with unusual care and courtesy.
Because of the testing activity by community groups, even brokers in areas
with inter-racial housing markets have become wary of black home seekers.
In the 1979 and 1980 testing audits monitored by the South Cook County
Suburban Housing Center, an increasing number of black testers were asked
point-blank if they were testers. 72 Few white testers were asked. Thus,
experimental bias increasingly contaminates testing surveys as this activity is
pursued by community groups. But an unanticipated benefit of broker
awareness of testing activity is that brokers will be more restrained in steering
bona fide home buyers as well as testers. Thus, the use of testers has resulted
in the classic example of the experiment changing the behavior of the subject
of the experiment.
Both research objectivity and methodology are strained in steering surveys
designed for suits charging certain brokers with illegal racial steering. Re-
searchers involved in steering surveys take special precautions to be scientif-
ically objective in the use of matched tester teams, in the selection of brokers,
and in the delineation of neighborhoods that are the targets of steering. But
it is not practical to sue the dozens of brokers who are perceived to practice
illegal steering by their victims. Thus, a handful of the offending brokers
are chosen as examples of the larger group of brokers perceived to be
engaging in steering, which can lead to methodological problems in regard
to the representativeness of the samples.
B. Proof of Racial Steering
Even isolated cases of racial steering are illegal. Additionally, the contin-
uation of such illegal steering practices on the part of the accused brokers
may lead to the solid ghettoization of the targeted steering areas. This
presupposes either that the accused brokers control all the sales in the affected
areas or that illegal steering practices are replicated by most, or all, brokers
active in these areas. A necessary, if not a sufficient, proof that illegal
72. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE SOUTH SUBURBAN HOUSING CENTER, AUDITING CONTRACT
OF REAL ESTATE SALES MARKET (1980).
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steering is universal within a black steering area is to show that most, or
all, sales are made to black buyers.
A typical defense made by brokers accused of steering is that black home
buyers have housing preferences that differ from those of white home buyers.
One such preference would be for less costly housing because of lower assets
and income. Another preference would be for areas where the majority is
black. Economic segregation and voluntary segregation, discussed earlier, 73
are labels that often describe these sets of preferences.
To counter these arguments, plaintiffs in housing discrimination suits must
show that black steering target areas are comparable to white steering target
areas in the cost of housing and in racial composition. The availability of
Multiple Listing Service (MLS) lists of single-family home sales by street
address and municipality provides a source for comparison of the price
distribution of homes sold in the white and integrated areas. But the defi-
nition and delineation of the racial composition of such areas are more
problematic.
Steering surveys must measure the racial composition of households in
neighborhoods that are perceived to be the target for black home buyers
steered by brokers. This is especially true for neighborhoods that were all
white at the time of the 1980 census. It is not enough to say that brokers
and residents "perceive" some neighborhoods to be white and other neigh-
borhoods to be racially changing. These perceptions are no doubt important
for the behavior of brokers and households. But they must be buttressed by
more objective evidence, especially when the brokers deny that they have
such perceptions. Estimates of both the racial composition and the turnover
of housing units over time should be made for the areas delineated as steering
targets.
For purposes of delineating steering target areas, the racial turnover rate
is the critical measure. This rate permits the calculation of the consolidation
index discussed earlier.7 4 The projection of this index yields an estimate of
the time it will take for a neighborhood to become entirely black. Not only
is the racial turnover rate per year more important than the racial composition
of a group of households, it is also easier to measure. Such data can be
garnered from a community's newcomer welcome program. Normally, com-
munity groups in integrated suburbs have a reliable count of the number of
transfers from white to black occupancy.
MLS listings of homes sold are the major source of information on exits
and entries of households. These listings also include information on the
sales price and the selling broker. Combining these items of information, it
is possible to plot home sales and prices to black and white buyers by broker,
street, and subdivision. Such records can be used to delineate white and
integrated areas, to measure the stock and flow of black households, and
73. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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to identify the brokers that steer black and white homebuyers to target areas.
The above discussion has delineated methodologies and explained problems
in attempting to prove racial steering. Such proof is clearly needed to bring
a successful housing discrimination suit against a housing broker. Discrim-
ination actions can also be brought against municipalities and other state
agencies. These actions are usually based on the equal protection clause. Use
of the equal protection clause in housing discrimination actions, however,
has been effectively precluded due to constraints imposed by the courts.
V. PROVING HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
A. Discriminatory Purpose Versus Discriminatory Effect
Laws and actions by the state can be both overtly and covertly racially
discriminatory in their effect. Overtly discriminatory laws, such as the Jim
Crow laws,7" were made illegal by the Brown decision of 1954 and the civil
rights laws of the 1960's. But many laws today are racially neutral on their
face and yet exert a disproportionate impact on blacks. Poll taxes in the
South were racially neutral; yet, the Voting Rights Act76 was required to
remedy the laws' disproportionate impact on blacks and the laws' inferred
discriminatory intent.
There are many other facially neutral laws and programs that affect blacks
disproportionately. In large cities like Chicago, the overwhelming majority
of beneficiaries of public schools, public housing, and public assistance
programs are black. Laws and actions restricting these programs have a
disproportionate impact on blacks. But in spite of many attempts by civil
rights groups, the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to extend a special
status under the equal protection clause to education, 77 housing,7 8 and pov-
erty.79 Before 1976, lower courts struggled with the question of whether
discriminatory impact alone was sufficient to challenge a facially neutral law
without proving that the law was racially motivated.
In 1976, the Supreme Court squarely tackled the purpose-effect dichotomy
in the Davis" case. The plaintiffs in Davis challenged the validity of a literacy
test used by the City of Washington in hiring police officers. The plaintiffs
contended that the test disqualified many blacks and thus discriminated
against them on the basis of race. The defendants convinced the district
court that they affirmatively recruited blacks and that the literacy skills were
75. Jim Crow laws were laws passed by states to promote or require segregation or promote
suppression of blacks. For a comprehensive collection of these state statutes, see SEGREGATION
AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE STATES: A SURVEY OF STATE SEGREGATION LAWS
1865-1953 (B. Reams & P. Wilson eds. 1975).
76. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1982).
77. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
78. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
79. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
80. See supra notes 22, 24 and accompanying text.
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necessary to maintain professional standards.8 ' The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the
grounds that discriminatory impact superseded criteria of professional stand-
ards. The appellate court found that lower black literacy scores reflected
segregated and inferior schooling more so than an inability to be a police
officer. 2
The Supreme Court held that the appellate court and similar lower court
findings of racial discrimination based solely on discriminatory impact were
erroneous. 3 Such a rule, the Court said, could ultimately invalidate tax,
welfare, regulatory, and licensing statutes merely because of claims of dis-
proportionate impact on blacks.8 4 In lieu of discriminatory impact, the Court
ruled that proof of discriminatory purpose is required to show violation of
the equal protection clause.85 Recognizing that discriminatory intent may be
disguised or may be among a number of legitimate and illegitimate motives,
the Court suggested ways that a plaintiff could prove discriminatory intent
as a dominating purpose. The impact of the official action-whether it bears
more heavily on one race than another-may be an important starting point. 86
"Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. ' 87 Proof
of discriminatory impact, thus, must be supplemented by evidence bearing
on intent. Professor Eli, six years earlier, set out guidelines for proof of
such intent. One must weigh elements from "various evidentiary sources
[including]: the terms of the law in issue, those effects which must have
been foreseen by the decision makers, the historical context in which the law
was passed, and the legislative history and other recorded statements of
intention."8
Prior to the Davis decision, the Supreme Court and lower courts were
divided, ambiguous, or vague on the purpose-effect issue.8 9 In spite of the
unanimity of the Davis decision, the Court failed to fully elaborate on the
methods of proving discriminatory intent. In Arlington Heights, the Court
attempted to set out factors which could be indicative of discriminatory
intent.
81. Id. at 235-36. The district court opinion appears at 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972).
82. Davis, 512 F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
83. 426 U.S. at 244-45.
84. Id. at 248.
85. Id. at 239.
86. Id. at 242.
87. Id.
88. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1220 (1970).
89. See, e.g., Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discrimi-
natory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961, 972-74; Comment, Proof
of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis,
Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725, 727-28
(1977).
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B. The Arlington Heights Decision: An Evaluation
One year after Davis, the Supreme Court applied the discriminatory intent
requirement of Davis to the Arlington Heights zoning case. In Arlington
Heights, the Court addressed a claim that Arlington Heights discriminatorily
blocked the passage of a rezoning application to bar the influx of a multi-
family housing project. 90 The Court elaborated on the mechanics of proving
intent. It recognized that such an attempt "demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." 9'
Acknowledging the multiplicity of purposes in legislation, the Court said
that the plaintiff need not show that a racial purpose was the sole or even
dominant motivating factor. 92 Citing Mt. Healthy City Board of Education
v. Doyle,93 however, the Court held that proof of discriminatory purpose
alone was not sufficient to challenge the compelling interest of the state's
action. 94 The Court determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove discrimi-
natory purpose, and thus dismissed the equal protection claim. 95
Previous court differences on the purpose-effect issue varied with the type
and importance of the law being challenged. Thus, the Supreme Court readily
subordinated purpose to effect in complaints of discrimination affecting
voting and first amendment rights. 96 Fair employment and housing rights
were apparently regarded as less deserving of such treatment. The Supreme
Court tipped the balance between legitimate state interests and minority
rights in favor of the state in Davis. Perhaps the Court believed that an
affirmation of the appellate court's finding in Davis would have been
interpreted as an endorsement of racial quotas in public employment hiring.
In deference to the Court, the condemnation of reliance on discriminatory
effect in Davis may well have been sparked by the relatively weak case
presented by the petitioners in light of the strong state interest.
The Supreme Court's application of the discriminatory purpose require-
ment in Arlington Heights, however, was more distressing. Arlington Heights
presented the Court with a stronger case than Davis, yet the Court applied
90. 429 U.S. at 254.
91. Id. at 266.
92. Id. at 265.
93. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
94. 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
95. Id. at 270.
96. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1982)), abolished poll taxes and literacy tests and gave to the
Attorney General the power to register black voters in districts evidencing low voter registration.
This exceptional power of federal intervention was endorsed by the Supreme Court in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Court decisions involving ideologies for and against racial equality, based upon the first
amendment, include Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (first and fourteenth amendment
violated by a statute outlawing advocacy, as opposed to incitement, of violence); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (freedom of speech includes the right to assemble to protest
segregation); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (actual malice required
in a libel action involving the purchase of newspaper ads critical of state officials).
[Vol. 34:491
1985] HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN CHICAGO 509
the same criteria to each case. The exclusion of moderate and low income
households should have outweighed the alleged state interest in maintaining
property values.
Indeed, the appellate court had rejected Arlington Heights's claim that
protecting the integrity of its zoning plan was a compelling interest for equal
protection purposes. 97 Moreover, the city of Arlington Heights lacked any
of the evidence of minority involvement and affirmative action presented by
the Washington Police Department in Davis. The Supreme Court overlooked
the statistical proof of racial impact and the historical record that had
convinced the Seventh Circuit that discrimination had occurred.
The statistical proof of discriminatory impact and the historical record
considered by the appellate court are described as follows by Robert Schwenn,
co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights:
The historical context included the facts that Arlington Heights
had grown from a small village in 1950 to the most residentially
segregated city in the Chicago area among municipalities with over
50,000 residents; that the village's spectacular and highly segregated
growth patterns paralleled those of the suburban area where it was
located, which from 1960 to 1970 had also taken some 100,000 jobs
from the City of Chicago; and that Arlington Heights had never
permitted or supported any subsidized housing within its borders,
even though the massive growth in its area had created a desperate
and growing need for low- and moderate-income housing there. With
one judge dissenting, the court of appeals also found that the
ultimate effect of the village's refusal to permit construction of the
MHDC development was to block the only opportunity to have any
subsidized, integrated housing in Arlington Heights and thus to
perpetuate massive residential segregation in the area. 9s
The plaintiffs were not allowed to document discriminatory intent by the
district court. 9  Even if they had, statements in the public record of
discriminatory intent on the part of officials engaged in policies with
disproportionate racial impact are rare. One court, remarking on the decline
of bigotry in the lexicon of politicians, has stated:
Municipal officials acting in their official capacities seldom, if
ever, announce on the record that they are pursuing a particular
course of action because of their desire to discriminate against a
racial minority. Even individuals acting from invidious motivations
97. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 260.
98. Schwemm, supra note 89, at 1014-15.
99. The Arlington Heights decision was tried at the district court level before the Supreme
Court's Davis decision. Thus, the plaintiffs did not address the issue of discriminatory purpose.
429 U.S. at 268. The Supreme Court did not believe it necessary to remand the case to allow
the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove discriminatory intent. Id. at 270.
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realize the unattractiveness of their prejudices when faced with their
perpetuation in the public record. It is only in private conversation,
with individuals assumed to share their bigotry, that open statements
of discrimination are made.'°°
Thus, Arlington Heights requires plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent
without acknowledging that public officials will rarely provide plaintiffs with
the requisite evidence. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, has recently addressed a housing discrimination case where public
officials, arguably, made statements indicative of discriminatory purpose.
C. HOPE, Inc. v. County of DuPage
In HOPE, Inc. v. County of DuPage,""' the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reviewed a district court's finding that DuPage County
discriminated against low-income persons through exclusionary housing prac-
tices. The law suit was brought by individual plaintiffs representing a class
and HOPE, Inc., a not-for-profit housing organization. The plaintiffs alleged
that the county, its board members, certain land owners, and developers
deprived the plaintiffs of their rights secured by the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments.
At the district court level, Judge Hubert Will, using the criteria announced
in Arlington Heights,"'2 determined "that DuPage County zoning practices
effectively excluded non-white residents."'' 3 The court found that there was
a series of official acts which evidenced discriminatory intent and that the
county's zoning laws did not serve a legitimate state interest.104 Thus, the
defendants were found to have engaged in discriminatory housing practices.
The HOPE litigation at the district court level resulted in over 2800 pages
of evidence. 05 DuPage County was found to have the lowest percentage of
inexpensive housing in the Chicago metropolitan area. °6 Further, only 0.26%
of the county's population was black. 0 7 The DuPage County Housing
Authority, in charge of low income housing, was found to enjoy "the
100. Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1064 (4th Cir. 1982).
101. 738 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'g, 771 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1983).
102. 717 F.2d at 1066-67. The appellate court noted that the district court "considered
statements of public officials, reports of publications, actual decisions of County agencies, as
well as reasonable inferences which can be drawn from all factors." Id. at 1067. In Arlington
Heights, the Supreme Court suggested that discriminatory intent could be shown through
investigation of the historical background of a challenged decision, the sequence of events
leading to the decision, departures fron normal operating procedure, and statements of the
decisional body. 429 U.S at 267-68.
103. 717 F.2d at 1069.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1066.
106. Id. at 1064.
107. Id.
[Vol. 34:491
1985] HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN CHICAGO 511
distinction of having done less for fewer people over a longer period of time
than any other such authority."'' 8 These facts, standing alone, did not
evidence the requisite discriminatory intent necessary for a successful housing
discrimination suit. The district court, however, was presented with state-
ments of various officials which the court determined evidenced such intent.
Foremost among this evidence was the statement made by the Collector
and Treasurer of DuPage County. He stated in a 1971 Chicago Tribune
article that "[]ow income housing in DuPage County is like buying a case
of cancer."' 0 9 Further, a county board member was quoted as saying that
low-income "housing will not be welcome 'if they want us to lift the laws
so they can build fire traps and slums.' "0 Another board member flatly
opposed low-income housing."' A member of the City Council of Wheaton
stated that although housing for the elderly presented no problem, Wheaton
residents did not want low income housing." '2 Based on these and other
statements, the district court concluded that the defendants knowingly and
intentionally excluded low-income persons from living in DuPage county."3
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the defendants raised three arguments.
First, they contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
county's practices. Second, they believed that the plaintiffs failed to establish
that their constitutional rights were violated. Finally, the defendants argued
that the district court's judgment was not related to the violations as al-
leged. 114
In affirming the district court's decision, the appellate court determined
that the plaintiffs had the requisite standing to allege and demonstrate an
injury due to the defendants actions." 5 The court also found that the trial
court's finding of discriminatory intent was not erroneous." 6 Finally, the
appellate court determined that the district court order correctly targeted the
cause of the discrimination-the county zoning laws." 7 Thus, the HOPE
decision represented a housing case in which discriminatory intent was
proven.
The Seventh Circuit, however, accepted the defendants' petition for re-
hearing."" In its second opinion on the case, the appellate court held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the housing discrimination suit." 9 The
108. Id. at 1065.
109. Id. at 1067.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1068.
113. Id. at 1069.
114. Id. at 1069-70.
115. Id. at 1073.
116. Id. at 1076.
117. Id. at 1077.
118. HOPE, 738 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
119. Id. at 816.
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court relied on the Supreme Court decision of Warth v. Seldin.'20 Specifically,
the court found that none of the plaintiffs were directly injured by the
actions of the defendants.' 2 According to the court, there were "no alle-
gations nor proof offered by the individual plaintiffs establishing that a
single proposed project for low or moderate income housing was in any way
impeded, much less denied, by any discrete and concerted activity on the
part of the DuPage County Board."' 22 The court also distinguished the
Arlington Heights case, stating that unlike the plaintiffs in that case, the
HOPE plaintiffs were unable to point to a single project that the defendants
had impeded. 23
Regarding the statements relied on by the trial court in determining that
the defendants had intentionally discriminated, the appellate court found
that these statements did not bear on the litigation. First, the County
Treasurer was neither a board member nor a defendant in the suit.124 The
board member's remark regarding "fire traps and slums" was tempered by
that member's explanation that he was referring to local building codes, not
the county zoning laws.' 25 Thus, thirteen years after the filing of the HOPE
suit, the appellate court dismissed the case based on its analysis of the
threshold issue of standing.
26
This diametrically opposed interpretation of the same factual foundation
illustrates the disconcerting, zigzagging propensities of the courts in rulings
on housing bias cases. Future plaintiffs cannot hope to match the over-
whelming direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent and
impact in the HOPE case. The use of the equal protection clause in housing
discrimination suits to overcome residential segregation in the Chicago area
has been greatly curtailed by the Arlington Heights and HOPE decisions.
120. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The HOPE court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that
they were directly injured by the actitivity of the county board. 738 F.2d at 807. The Supreme
Court in Warth stated that "a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices
must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and
that he personally would benefit from the court's intervention." 422 U.S. at 508 (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted), quoted in HOPE, 738 F.2d at 806. The Warth decision is reviewed
in Powell, Sitting and Standing in the Supreme Court: Warth Standing and the Problem PT
Distributive Justice, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 429-(1984), and Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated:
Warth v. Selden and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373
(1978).
121. 738 F.2d at 807.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 812.
124. Id. at 800.
125. Id. at 801.
126. Id. at 816. Interestingly, the appellate court indicated that the plaintiffs may have failed
in their attempt to demonstrate invidious discrimination. The court stated:
While we have decided not to reach the merits of the discrimination claim as we find
no standing, we have grave doubts as to whether the plaintiffs sufficiently established
the necessary intentional and invidious discriminatory purpose on the County Board's
part necessary in order to met the burden under . . .Davis and Arlington Heights.
Id. at 816 n.9 (citations omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Brown is a landmark decision that overturned the Supreme Court's pre-
vious "separate but equal" doctrine and gave lower courts the unprecented
power of the injunction in cases of racial equality. During the 1950's and
1960's, the courts and Congress took steps to close all avenues used by the
southern states to escape the new laws outlawing de jure acts of racial
desegregation and discrimination. The courts, however, were less effective
and consistent in curtailing more subtle effects of racial discrimination
resulting from intense de facto residential segregation in large northern cities
and suburbs.
The minimal impact of Brown's mandate on racial segregation in schools
and housing in large urban areas like Chicago reflects both a neoconservative
swing of the pendulum in the national ideology and the traditional mecha-
nisms used by the courts in moderating the impact of policies of social
change. New rules of reception can open the door somewhat; but, if too
many unwelcome guests enter, rules of refusal can shut the door again. The
frequent use of the rule of refusal in fair housing cases is in response to
both negative political feedback and the ever expanding work-load of the
courts.
The exercise of the right of refusal in Arlington Heights and HOPE has
effectively shut the door for housing complaints grounded on the equal
protection clause. This, in turn, has forced plaintiffs to rely on the Fair
Housing Act, which has but a limited remedial impact. Narrow and equivocal
interpretations by the courts have conspired with weak and uncoordinated
enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development to blunt the attack against housing bias. Thus,
exclusionary zoning laws and racial steering perpetuate segregation even
though outlawed by the fourteenth amendment, the civil rights acts, and the
Brown decision.

